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A Method Inside the Madness: Understanding the
European Union State Aid and Taxation Rulings
Christopher Bobby ∗

Abstract
International headlines have been consumed with the proliferation of international tax
havens and “sweetheart deals” given to multinational companies with the hopes that they would
invest in a given country. In response to such concerns, the E.U. Commission has issued a spate
of decisions in which it concludes that certain taxation rulings given by State Members to
international corporations constitute illegal state aid. These decisions have both befuddled and
outraged various parties in the international community, including states and multinational
corporations, who claim that the Commission is acting both unilaterally and without precedent.
This Comment surveys the applicable case law and analyzes in detail the rationale behind the
Commission’s decisions in order to uncover some of the fundamental principles driving the E.U.’s
executive body.
This Comment reaches a number of conclusions. One, “selectivity” and “advantage”
applied by the Commission in determining the existence of state aid is a purposeful conflation by
the Commission rather than a brash departure from earlier precedent. The Commission’s rulings
also reveal the importance of both the reference system and the use of treaties in purposefully
framing any tax rulings that a multinational may receive. Finally, the use of generalized and
individualized schemes will have vastly different consequences, given that these two groups of
measures are analyzed very differently by the Commission. Case law will also reveal significant
flaws in the Commission’s decisions, including the fact that the Commission has applied these
terms inconsistently. Additionally, the Commission retains significant power to rule arguendo
that a measure has the potential to distort competition and affect intra-state trade. The preceding
considerations are important, as they ultimately affect the ex ante planning considerations of the
multinationals and states involved. In the era of higher, more rigorous tax scrutiny, multinational
corporations and Member States must be more purposeful and vigilant in planning.
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I. I NTRODUCTION
At the end of August 2016, headlines hit the news that the E.U. would charge
Apple $14.6 billion dollars in unpaid taxes, payable to Ireland. 1 Apple argued that
the Commission’s tax ruling “upended the international tax system and would
damage jobs and investment in Europe.” 2 The U.S. chimed in, arguing that the
ruling would erode foreign investment, the European business climate, and,
ultimately, economic partnership between the U.S. and the E.U. 3 In the eyes of
the Obama Administration, the decision essentially amounted to theft, by the
E.U., of revenue from U.S. taxpayers. 4 In its official response, the U.S. Treasury
published a white paper outlining various objections, including concerns that the
E.U. Commission’s approach was new (departing from prior E.U. case law), that
retroactive recoveries defied legitimate expectations on the part of both State
Members and multinational companies, and that this novel approach was
inconsistent with international norms. 5
The recovery at issue was associated with a negative decision by the
Commission concerning a reduction of Apple’s tax base within Ireland, meaning
the Commission found the reduction to constitute illegal state aid. 6 In a set of
decisions, the E.U. similarly probed the tax arrangements of both Amazon and
Fiat in Luxembourg and Starbucks in the Netherlands over concerns that these
E.U. Member States were acting as tax havens to attract multinational companies,
including, in many cases, those from the U.S. 7 The principal motivation behind
these investigations was not only to achieve the common state aid goal of creating
a fair marketplace for corporations in the E.U., but also to avoid the creation of
international tax havens. 8

1

See Ivana Kottasova, E.U. Hits Apple with $14.6 Billion Tax Bill, CNN MONEY (Aug. 30, 2016)
https://perma.cc/TWW5-BCQD.

2

Id.
Id.

3
4
5

6
7
8

Id.
See Jethro Mullen, U.S. Warns E.U.: Don’t Hit Apple with a Massive Tax Bill, CNN MONEY (Aug. 25,
2016) https://perma.cc/23BD-F7J2 (referencing U.S. DEP’T OF THE TREASURY, THE EUROPEAN
COMMISSION’S RECENT STATE AID INVESTIGATIONS OF TRANSFER PRICING RULINGS (2016))
(arguing that the decisions go against precedent and undermine international norms, and that the
retroactive recoveries should not occur).
See Kottasova, supra note 1.
See Mullen, supra note 5.
See Nicholas J. DeNovio, Elisabetta Righini, & Nicolle Nonken Gibbs, State Aid: What It is, and How
It May Affect Multinationals and Tax Departments, TAX EXECUTIVE, Apr. 6, 2016,
https://perma.cc/2T8X-AREV.
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In the Apple case, the company paid tax at 1 percent or less on profits
attributed to subsidiaries in Ireland, a number well below the 35 percent top
corporate tax rate in the U.S. and Ireland’s own corporate tax rate of 12.5 percent. 9
Such a favorable tax rate prompted concern from European lawmakers, 10 which
in turn led to retorts due to U.S. outrage against the aforementioned decision. In
the Commission’s view, investigations into “sweetheart deals” such as those
between Apple and Ireland are not aimed at stealing U.S. tax revenue, but rather
at ensuring that E.U. law applies fairly to every company with headquarters or
subsidiaries in Europe. 11 Consequently, these decisions concern both international
tax issues and state aid law within the E.U. 12
On December 19, 2016, Apple appealed the decision that illegal state aid was
given to the company and its subsidiaries. 13 “State aid,” as defined by the
Commission, consists of an advantage granted in any form whatsoever on a
selective basis by a Member State to an economic actor. 14 It is illegal primarily
because it distorts competition between E.U. Member States. 15 In its appeal,
Apple charged that the E.U. acted unilaterally and changed the rules retroactively,
alleging that there was a predetermined outcome since the start of the case. 16
Ireland also filed its own appeal, claiming that the E.U. “overstepped its powers
by trying to rewrite Irish tax law.” 17 Additionally, Ireland claimed in its appeal that
the E.U. committed a grave error in misinterpreting Irish law, contending that its
tax rules were within the reference system of the Irish tax code, following a
portion stating that “nonresident companies shouldn’t pay income tax on profit
that isn’t generated in Ireland.” 18 At the heart of these claims are charges that the
Commission meddled in Ireland’s sovereignty to set its own tax code and laws. 19
The Commission answered that neither a consistent nor objective criteria was
9

See Kottasova, supra note 1.

10

Id.
See Mullen, supra note 5.

11
12

13

14
15

See, for example, Phedon Nicolaides, Grant Versus Fiscal Aid: In Search of Economic Rationality, 2015
EUR. ST. AID L.Q. 410, 416 (arguing that fiscal aid may induce companies to invest in countries that
grant it).
See Brett Molina, Apple Appeals E.U.’s $14B Ruling on Irish Taxes, USA TODAY (Dec. 19, 2016)
https://perma.cc/9K2Y-X3B6; see also John Kennedy, European Commission Full Ruling: Claims Ireland
Gave Apple Illegal State Aid, SILICON REPUBLIC (Dec. 20, 2016) https://perma.cc/26RX-ECVC.
EUROPEAN COMM’N, State Aid Control (Sept. 9, 2016) https://perma.cc/ZXD5-GWJH.
Id.

16

See Sam Schechner, Apple Hits Back Over E.U. Irish-Tax Decision, WALL ST. J. (Dec. 19, 2016)
https://perma.cc/UT38-JSBD.

17

Id.
Id.

18
19

See Mullen, supra note 5.
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applied in determining the profit allocation to Apple’s Irish branches. 20 What this
dispute ultimately made clear is that it is impossible to forecast how E.U. courts
“will rule in an area that has not been tested before.” 21
As further rulings are handed down, tax professionals, attorneys,
multinational corporations, and E.U. Member States will try to decipher the
decisions to determine what kinds of tax benefits they can hope to give and receive
and what kinds they cannot. For many of these interested parties, billions of
dollars, as well as entire national economies, are at stake in every E.U. Commission
ruling. 22 The discrepancies between various E.U. Commission Rulings and the
differences in local tax rulings will continue to impact companies’ decisions
regarding whether or not to place their subsidiaries in the E.U. for tax purposes.
Finding clarity and predictability in the Commission’s decisions will have wideranging effects, including implications for available tax revenue in the U.S. and
Europe, increased certainty for international businesses, and the raising of broader
questions of retroactivity and tax avoidance.
Using the Apple case as an anchor, this Comment aims to find some
distinguishing characteristics between those instances where the Commission has
found a taxation agreement by a Member State and corporation to be state aid,
and those where it has not. Ultimately, it will discern a working principle
distinguishing state aid from non-state aid outcomes, with the aim of predicting
the outcomes of future cases and aiding multinational corporations in structuring
their businesses.
The aim of this Comment is to analyze the entirety of case law surrounding
taxation and state aid to develop a working understanding of the principles and
concepts applied by the Commission in its decision. By identifying trends in the
rulings on various taxation benefits, this Comment will reveal a number of key
rules that the Commission employs when reaching its decisions.
Section II of this Comment briefly discusses the concept of state aid as it
has been applied to taxation and transfer pricing arrangements. It then analyzes
both the facts behind and rationale given in the group of recent decisions
regarding Amazon, Apple, Fiat, and Starbucks. Section III outlines the various
rules applied by the E.U. Commission in the decisions concerning taxation and
state aid law. Section IV analyzes the history of decisions handed down by the
Commission with regard to state aid and taxation, pulling out various trends that
indirectly articulate the principles being applied. Section V concludes by
addressing normative aspects of the Commission decisions and policy
20
21

22

See Kennedy, supra note 13.
See, for example, Julia Fioretti, Apple Appeals Against E.U. Tax Ruling, Brussels Says No Cause for Low
Tax Bill, REUTERS (Dec. 19, 2016) https://perma.cc/GR6G-NVKX.
U.S. DEPARTMENT OF THE TREASURY, The European Commission’s Recent State Aid Investigations of
Transfer Pricing Rulings 22 (2016).
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considerations for multinational corporations and E.U. Member States moving
forward.

II. B ACKGROUND
The aggressive application of tax rulings to E.U. state aid law presents
uncharted waters for lawyers, tax planners, and multinational corporations. 23 To
fully understand the arc of the case law on this issue, it is important to first review
the concept of “state aid” and its relatively new application to the realm of tax
law. As will be outlined below, state aid law is geared towards a variety of
measures, and is typically applied to “positive” forms of aid such as subsidies or
aid granted to certain industries or corporations. 24 Section II first explains the
concept of state aid and how the regime is applied to tax rulings by Member States.
It then uses the Apple case as an example of the regime as applied to a specific tax
ruling, and further discusses the controversy surrounding the decision as a staging
area for determining the principles behind the controversial decisions.

A. The Concept of State Aid and Taxation
The European Commission is in charge of ensuring that companies
operating within Member States do not gain unfair advantage over competitors
through government support. 25 This advantage can be granted in any form
whatsoever, conferred on a selective basis, and is known as “state aid.” 26 In order
to qualify as state aid, a measure must typically have four features. It must (1) be
an “intervention by the State or through State resources,” 27 (2) give the “recipient
an advantage on a selective basis,” (3) distort competition, and (4) be capable of
affecting trade between Member States. 28 Even if some aid meets the four
features, a number of exemptions exist and may be invoked as long as they fit
within the policy objectives of the E.U. 29

23

See DeNovio et al., supra note 8.

24

Id.
See State Aid Control, supra note 14.

25
26
27

Id.
This factor will nearly always be met in tax cases because the European Commission stated that “a
loss of tax revenue is equivalent to a consumption of State resources in the form of fiscal
expenditure.” Commission Notice 98/C, 1998 O.J. 384/0 § 10, https://perma.cc/TME6-6NL4.

28

Id. at §§ 9–12. For an explanation of how these factors are specifically applied to tax measures, see
generally id.

29

Id.
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The E.U. requires that any new aid measures be reported to the Commission,
which triggers a preliminary investigation. 30 If the Commission finds that aid has
been misused, it can open a formal investigation procedure. If a new aid measure
is not reported, an investigation can also arise from a third-party complaint or
through the Commission’s own initiative. 31 Typically, the Commission has
challenged specific tax rulings as opposed to tax regimes generally, although there
is one case where the latter has been investigated. 32 There are three possible
outcomes at the end of a formal investigation: a positive decision (no aid, or aid
is compatible with internal market), a conditional decision (compatible aid subject
to conditions in report), or a negative decision (the measure is incompatible). 33 All
decisions made by the Commission are subject to review by the General Court,
and if appealed, the European Court of Justice (ECJ). 34 The typical case of state
aid involves direct grants or subsidies that must be examined in light of the factors
mentioned above. However, indirect measures, such as relief from tax burdens or
a reduction of the tax base, can also be considered state aid. 35
With regards to taxation, 36 the intersection of tax law and state aid law in the
E.U. contains no parallels in domestic U.S. law, making these cases troublesome
for both U.S. tax practitioners and corporations. 37 The concept of state aid rules
as applied to tax law relies on the theory that a decreased amount of owed tax
could “constitute an impermissible advantage provided by an E.U. member state
to a beneficiary.” 38 The Commission’s increased use of state aid law to challenge
individual E.U. Member State tax rulings arose directly after the Great Recession. 39
30

European Commission, State Aid Procedures (May 29, 2015) https://perma.cc/655N-YZV4.

31

See DeNovio et al., supra note 8 (There are many cases where the member state has not notified the
Commission of their tax rulings or tax regimes due to the simple fact that these E.U. countries have
“not generally contemplated the possibility that individual rulings or ruling systems would constitute
state aid.”).

32

Id. (The Belgian “excess profit” ruling system is the only regime that has been challenged.).
See State Aid Procedures, supra note 30.

33
34
35
36

37
38
39

Id.
See State Aid Control, supra note 14.
For a history of the evolution of state aid and its eventual application to harmful tax practices, see
Edoardo Traversa & Alessandra Flamini, Fighting Harmful Tax Competition Through E.U. State Aid
Law: Will the Hardening of Soft Law Suffice?, 2015 EUR ST. AID L.Q. 323 (arguing that the use of state
aid in tax cases has evolved in the face of pressure to combat tax avoidance and the constraints on
the rules that would traditionally be used to do so).
See DeNovio et al., supra note 8.
Id.
Id. (“[I]n a period of tight public budgets and sluggish growth, the E.C. considered its two options
to attempt to reduce the effects of a lack of unified tax treatment of company profits throughout
the E.U.: tax harmonizing legislation (which requires unanimity by the EC and thus is very difficult
to reach) or state aid control (for which the EC has exclusive competence).”).
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Chief among the Commission’s concerns were aggressive tax planning measures
by member states and the misuse of international tax treaties to proactively justify
double non-taxation rather than avoid double taxation. 40
In “transfer pricing” tax relief cases, such as the Apple case, state aid comes in
the form of tax rulings, which are comfort letters issued by national tax authorities
to give a company more specific information on how its corporate tax will be
calculated. 41 Specifically, the Member States issue advanced price agreements to
the multinational companies in question. These price agreements set the prices
between subsidiaries engaged in transactions for purposes of calculating the
company’s taxable base. 42 In the Apple case and others dealing with “transfer
pricing,” the Commission found that the Member States endorsed “artificial and
complex methods” in their advanced pricing agreements to create favorable
taxable profits that attracted and kept multinational corporations. 43 Rather than
reflecting market prices (i.e. economic reality), the transfer prices set between
subsidiaries reduced their tax burden, which ultimately conferred an advantage to
their parent companies. 44
The Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD)
Guidelines are the method used by the Commission to determine an arm’s length
price that prudent independent operators would accept. Typically, advanced
pricing agreements (APAs) not falling within the Guidelines are considered
distorted, and therefore illegal state aid. 45 Even those that do fall within accepted
methodologies for determining APAs may be considered illegal state aid if they
confer a selective advantage to the corporations involved. 46 E.U. Commission
investigations on tax rulings have ruled favorably on metrics other than market

40

Id.

41

European Commission Press Release, IP/15/5880, Commission Decides Selective Tax Advantages
for Fiat in Luxembourg and Starbucks in The Netherlands are Illegal Under E.U. State Aid Rules
(Oct. 21, 2015), https://perma.cc/EN42-DJF2.
Id.

42
43
44
45

46

Id.
Id.
See Org. for Econ. Co-operation and Dev. [OECD], OECD Transfer Pricing Guidelines for Multinational
Enterprises and Tax Administrations (2010) at 32, https://perma.cc/P6MH-AAZ6 [hereinafter OECD
Transfer Pricing Guidelines].
For example, in the Apple ruling, the court determined that even though the method used to
determine taxable profits followed an OECD-approved formula, neither Irish Revenue nor Apple
provided sufficient justification for the decision. European Commission, Ireland and Alleged Aid
to Apple, SA.38373 (2014/C).
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price, 47 have given special designation for uses of certain products, 48 and have
allowed special circumstances for certain corporations. 49 These considerations
demonstrate the seeming unpredictability for when the Commission will
determine whether a ruling contains advantage or selectivity. Meanwhile, the
Commission continues to pursue its inquiry into the tax ruling practices of all E.U.
Member States. 50
While not every tax ruling involves APAs, these cases present significant
challenges to the parties involved in Member State tax rulings. Whether it is APAs,
an exemption from a certain amount of corporate taxes for a coordination center
in an E.U. country, or a tax deduction granted to players in a specific industry, the
terms of the ruling may have been hammered out between the State and the
multinational corporation years or decades prior to an ECJ ruling. 51 Consequently,
a multinational corporation may have determined its further tax planning using
the tax ruling as a basis. 52 The Commission’s actions, therefore, have retroactive
consequences for these corporations “beyond anything a taxpayer might have
considered possible under the typical challenges.” 53 Ultimately, these ramifications
make a clear understanding of the Commission’s motivations that much more
important.

B. The Apple Decision
1. The contested decision.
a) Facts.
The Apple decision concerned the tax treatment in Ireland of two
companies, Apple Operations Europe (AOE) and Apple Sales International
(ASI), incorporated in Ireland but not tax residents there under Irish rules defining
residence. 54 Apple used these Irish non-resident entities to achieve U.S. tax
47

48
49
50
51
52
53
54

European Commission Press Release IP/16/2683, State Aid: Commission Authorises Alternative
Income Tax Regime for Wholesale Diamond Sector in Belgium (July 29, 2016),
https://perma.cc/ZD94-AFA9.
Commission Notice, 2015 O.J. (C44/02), https://perma.cc/2VQ8-LNKB.
Commission Notice, 2016 O.J. C 25/02, https://perma.cc/Q6NJ-LGWZ.
See State Aid Procedures, supra note 30.
See DeNovio et al., supra note 8.
Id.
Id.
See Romero J.S. Tavares, Bret N. Bogenschneider, & Marta Pankiv, The Intersection of E.U. State Aid
and U.S. Tax Deferral: A Spectacle of Fireworks, Smoke, and Mirrors, 19 FLA. TAX REV. 121, 150 (2016).
(While the legal entities at issue were formed under Irish corporate law, they were not “managed
and controlled” from within Ireland.).
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deferral. These entities own valuable intangibles developed in the U.S., hold
substantial amounts of capital, and bear significant risks associated with Apple’s
European value chain. 55 The Commission alleged that both of these branches
benefited from unlawful state aid. 56 At issue was the fact that Apple’s extremely
valuable intellectual property was, for determining taxable profit, not attributed to
any of the Irish operating branches. 57 At the same time, both AOE and ASI
benefited from such intellectual property in the conduct of their operations. 58
AOE and ASI are 100 percent subsidiaries of Apple Operations
International, an entity that is also incorporated in Ireland but not a taxable
resident. 59 Both AOE and ASI are parties to a research and development sharing
agreement with other Apple subsidiaries worldwide. 60 All of the parties to this
R&D agreement pool the costs of the group’s worldwide R&D. 61
b) The Contested Measure.
In 1991, a basis for determining AOE’s Irish branch net profit was
proposed by Apple and agreed to by Irish Revenue (Revenue). 62 According to that
ruling, the net profit attributed to the AOE branch would be calculated as 65
percent of operating expenses up to an annual cap of between $60 and $70 million
USD, and 20 percent of operating expenses for any amount in excess of the $60–
$70 million USD range. 63 AOE’s agreement was also subject to a provision that if
the overall profit from the Irish operations under Apple Operations International
was less than the figure resulting from the agreed upon formula, the lower figure
would be used for determining taxable net profits. The ASI branch, on the other
hand, would be considered to have a net profit of 12.5 percent of all of that
branch’s operating cost. 64
In 2007, Apple and Revenue drafted a revised agreement for determining
the taxable profits for both AOE and ASI. It was agreed that AOE would have a
10–15 percent margin on branch operating costs, excluding any costs attributable
to any branch outside of Ireland, and a taxable intellectual property return of 1–5

55

Id. at 130.

56

Id. at 150.
Id. at 151.

57
58
59
60
61
62
63
64

Id. at 133.
See Ireland and Alleged Aid to Apple, supra note 46, at recital 47.
Id. at recitals 118, 120–121.
Id. at recital 121.
Id. at recital 61.
Id.
Id. at recital 59.
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percent. 65 For ASI, the basis for determining taxable net profit was modified in
that same year with a 10–15 percent margin on any branch operating costs (except
those attributed to a different branch). 66
A major issue for both the 1991 and 2007 agreements between Apple and
Revenue was the method used to determine the taxable profit. Revenue asked
Apple to state if there was any basis for the figure determined, and the corporation
stated there was no “scientific basis . . . however the figure was of such a
magnitude that [Apple] hoped that it would be seen to be a bona-fide proposal.” 67
None of the documents provided by Apple and Revenue to the European
Commission provided any explanation for the figures regarding the 2007 ruling,
nor did they provide a transfer pricing report or cost sharing agreement. 68
Consequently, the Commission decided to launch an investigation to determine
whether the agreement constituted illegal state aid.
c) The Ruling.
The court ultimately determined that the 1991 ruling was “negotiated”
rather than properly substantiated by comparable transactions as if the subsidiaries
in question were independent operators (and thus purchasing the rights to
intellectual property on the open market). 69 As for the 2007 agreement, the
transfer pricing method was in effect one of the arm’s-length principle pricing
methods known as the “transactional net margin method” (TNMM). 70 In this
specific case, the net profit indicator used for the TNMM method was operating
costs. 71 However, neither Apple nor Revenue offered a rationale for the choice of
that particular net profit indicator. Ultimately, the determination that the
agreements at hand were either negotiated or used methods lacking proper
rationale led to a determination of state aid.
When evaluating whether a given agreement constitutes state aid, the
Commission relies on the test articulated in Article 107(1) of the Treaty on the
Functioning of the European Union. In order to determine that the agreements
in 1991 and 2007 constituted state aid, the Commission applied the test,
determining whether (1) the measure was approved by Ireland and financed
through its funds; (2) the measure conferred an advantage on Apple; (3) the
advantage was selective; and (4) the measure had a distortive or potentially
65
66
67
68
69
70
71

Id. at recital 62.
Id. at recital 60.
Id. at recital 64.
Id. at recitals 67–68.
Id. at recital 147.
Id. at recitals 92–93. See Section III.B, infra.
Id. at recitals 93–94.
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distortive effect on competition and trade between E.U. Member States. 72 With
respect to the first prong, the Commission determined that the measure was
obviously imputed by and financed through Ireland, since lowering Apple’s tax
liability directly resulted in a loss to Ireland’s resources through taxation. 73 The
Commission quickly brushed through the fourth prong, assuming without
argument that because Apple is “globally active” and operates in multiple Member
States, any aid in its favor could have the potential to distort competition among
Member States and negatively affect intra-Union trade. 74
In reaching its decision, the Commission spent the majority of its time on
prongs (2) and (3). It collapsed these prongs into one test of “selective advantage”
(ordinarily, to determine whether a given measure confers an advantage on a
taxable entity, a court must compare the taxable method or regime to the ordinary
or “reference” tax system). 75 When the substance of a given ruling concerns
transfer-pricing arrangements between subsidiaries of a multinational corporation,
that ruling should not be materially different from one concerning two
independent operators acting under “normal market conditions.” 76 Using the
rationale outlined above, the court concluded that the arrangement here was
negotiated in 1991 and unsubstantiated by proper rationale in 2007. Because of
the very nature of the measure (the fact that it was a negotiated practice deviating
from the arm’s-length principle), the Commission presumed it was selective. 77

2. Reactions to the decisions.
In a reaction to the Apple decision and other cases against companies
including Fiat, Starbucks, and Amazon, the U.S. Department of the Treasury
authored a white paper criticizing the E.U.’s decisions and methodologies. 78 In
that paper, the U.S. Treasury argued that the Commission’s approach departed
from prior E.U. case law, wrongly authorized retroactive recoveries, and would
undermine the international tax system. 79 With regard to the first allegation—that
the approach departed from prior E.U. case law—the Treasury Department
72
73
74
75
76
77

Id. at sections 8.1–8.4.
Id.
Id. at recital 222.
Id. at section 8.2 .
Id. at recital 150.
Id.

78

See WHITE PAPER, supra note 22, at 1 (arguing that the decisions go against precedent and undermine
international norms, and that the retroactive recoveries should not occur). For another example of
a work criticizing the decisions for going against precedent and ignoring bilateral treaties, see Lowell
D. Yoder, The Disturbing E.U. State Aid Proceedings, 42 INT’L TAX J. 3 (2016).

79

See WHITE PAPER, supra note 22 at 1.
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alleged that the Commission “collapsed the concept of ‘advantage’ and
‘selectivity,’” which previously had been two separate tests under E.U. state aid
law. 80 This collapsing was particularly troubling because it was an abrupt departure
from the status quo by reducing the number of factors necessary for a finding of
state aid from four to three. 81 The white paper also argued that any economic
advantage given to a multinational corporation would be presumed to be selective,
unlike a standalone corporation. 82
The Treasury Department maintained their second allegation—that the
Commission wrongly authorized retroactive recoveries—because the approach in
the recent cases was “new and was not foreseeable by the relevant companies,”
and thus, any recovery of tax unpaid in the past would be retroactive and a novel
approach to state aid. 83 Furthermore, the white paper argues that these retroactive
recoveries are inconsistent with the legal principles of the E.U. 84 Finally, the white
paper asserts that the E.U.’s approach in newer state aid cases departs from
international norms because the “arm’s length principle” undermines the global
consensus on transfer pricing standards and prevents Member States from
fulfilling the conditions of their bilateral tax treaties. 85
Academics and tax professionals have also responded to the newer collection
of E.U. Commission decisions concerning taxation and state aid. Scholars have
argued that the state aid reviews of advanced pricing agreements create legal
uncertainty for a significant number of tax assessments, and that a new procedural
framework is required to provide for more legal certainty. 86 Other professionals
argue that, while the results may not be uncertain, they are unsatisfactory and for
that reason conceptual reform is necessary. 87 Additionally, some professionals
think that the recent decisions are so controversial that the important task of
international tax reform should be pursued through other means. 88 However,
there has yet to be a systematic overview of the facts and rules applied to the
various state aid cases concerning taxation. The next two Sections aim to provide

80
81
82
83
84
85
86

87

88

Id. at 6.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 14.
Id.
Id. at 17.
See, for example, Pierpaolo Rossi-Maccanico, A New Framework for State Aid Review of Tax Rulings, 2015
EUR. ST. AID L.Q. 371 (arguing that the Commission should adopt a new framework specifically to
fulfill their obligation of advance notification).
See, for example, Georgios Matsos, Systematic Misconceptions of State Aid Law in the Area of Taxation:
Principles for Conceptual Reform, 2014 EUR. ST. AID L.Q. 491 (2014).
See, for example, Elizabeth A. Jone, State Aid in the E.U. Through Tax Rulings and Transfer Pricing, Seton
Hall Law School Student Scholarship (2016) https://perma.cc/5X4P-57KE.
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clarity by outlining the rules applied in cases such as Apple and proposing a
coherent methodology used in the case law.

III. R ULES A PPLIED BY THE E UROPEAN C OMMISS ION IN
T AXATION AND S TATE A ID R ULINGS
While the rules applied by the Commission in analyzing Member State tax
rulings are few in number, they provide the main framework for determining
whether illegal state aid exists. Article 107 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the
European Union (TFEU), the primary source of law in these contested decisions,
contains a four-prong test to help courts analyze the rulings at issue. As will be
outlined in this section, the application of the TFEU to the fact-specific
circumstances of a given ruling is far more important than the test itself in the
abstract. TFEU has provided a flexible mechanism for analyzing a diverse range
of government aid. Section III.A provides a framework for analyzing the case law
by outlining the factors of the test as applied to taxation. Section III.B describes
the applicable rules for determining the proper reference transactions for cases
involving transfer-pricing rulings for subsidiaries.

A. Article 107 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the
European Union (TFEU)
The TFEU contains the main test used to determine whether a measure
constitutes illegal state aid. 89 Forming the detailed basis of E.U. law, the TFEU
sets out the scope of the E.U.’s legal authority and the legal principles where the
E.U.’s authority applies (all E.U. Member States are signatories to the TFEU). 90
Whereas Article 9 of the OECD Model Tax Convention and the OECD Transfer
Pricing Guidelines are non-binding instruments, the TFEU is binding on Member
States. 91 Additionally, their national tax rules are not excluded from the scope of
the TFEU. 92 The TFEU constitutes the rules used by the Commission to analyze
tax rulings and state aid concerns, and consequently serves as a critical starting
point for analyzing decisions such as Apple.
Article 107 of the TFEU (formerly Article 87 of the Treaty Establishing the
European Community) covers “aid granted by states.” 93 As previously discussed,
89

Consolidated Version of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union, Art. 107, 2008 O.J.
C 115/47 at 91–2 [hereinafter TFEU], https://perma.cc/WT9X-JPDL.

90

See id. at arts. 1–2.
See European Commission, Excess Profit Exemption in Belgium: Letter to Member State, 2016 O.J. (L
260), at recital 47.
Id.

91

92
93

See Matsos, supra note 87, at 493 (citing Article 107 et seq. TFEU).
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Article 107(1) outlines the four-part test historically used by the Commission to
determine the existence of state aid, namely, whether the aid is imputed and paid
for by the State, whether it threatens or indeed does distort competition and affect
trade between Member States, and whether it is selective and confers an advantage
on the recipient. 94 Additionally, subsections (2) and (3) of the TFEU cover
additional factors that, when present, either ensure or may make aid compatible with
the internal market, respectively. 95 Aid that has a “social character, granted to
individual consumers,” aid designed to repair damage from natural disasters, or
aid specifically meant for “the economy of certain areas of . . . Germany affected
by the division of Germany” ensure that the measure at issue is considered
compatible with the internal market. 96 Additional factors that may push aid to be
compatible with the internal market include promotion of economic development
in depressed areas and promotion of “common European interest,” among
others. 97
Specifically, with regards to taxation and state aid, Commission Notice 98/C
384/03 outlines the application of the factors under the TFEU Article 107(1) on
taxation. 98 For the first prong (whether it is imputed and paid for by the state), a
tax ruling can be considered granted by the State or through its resources if it
entails a loss of tax revenues. This is because, according to the Commission, “a
loss of tax revenue is equivalent to consumption of State resources in the form of
fiscal expenditure.” 99 The second prong, whether the ruling affects competition
and trade between Member States, is met if the recipient of the tax ruling engages
in an economic activity that deals with trade between Member States. 100 According
to the Commission, the sole fact of strengthened activity relative to other
economic competitors is enough to satisfy this prong, regardless of the size of the
aid, the market share of the recipient, or whether the recipient exports. 101
With regards to taxation, the third prong, “selectivity,” may be satisfied
through an exception to national tax provisions or through discretion on the part
of the revenue administration. However, if this selectivity is justified by the nature
of the reference system, it is not considered aid. 102 Lastly, the fourth prong, the
94

See European Commission, supra note 91.

95

Id.
Id.

96
97
98

99
100
101
102

Id.
See Commission Notice on the Application of the State Aid Rules to Measures Relating to Direct
Business Taxation, 1998 O.J. (C384/03), https://perma.cc/5GAC-GGW6.
Id. at recital 10.
Id. at recital 11.
Id.
Id. at recital 12.
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“advantage” factor, is provided through any reduction in a firm’s tax burden,
which can include reduction in tax base, amount of tax, or even a deferment of
tax obligations. 103 Because prongs three and four are arguably the most important
and most scrutinized of the EU tax provisions, it is critically important for
Member States and multinationals to consider the scope and nature of their
respective tax rulings.

B. Article 9 of the OECD Model Tax Convention & OECD
Transfer Pricing Guidelines
Unlike Article 107(1) of the TFEU, Article 9 of the Organization for
Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) Model Tax Convention is
non-binding on Member States, but does help guide the Commission when it rules
on state aid investigations. 104 Article 9 essentially codifies the “arm’s-length
principle” for transfer-pricing specific state aid investigations. 105 Essentially,
Article 9 recommends that in the case of transactions between two subsidiaries or
conjoined enterprises, the taxing Member State should treat any profits which
would have accrued had the two enterprises been independent operators as
taxable income. 106 This principle attempts to mitigate the benefit that
multinational companies receive from being taxed at a reduced rate on certain
transactions between independent operators who conduct most, if not all, of their
transactions in the open market.
The Commission also applies the OECD “Transfer Pricing Guidelines”
when adjudicating cases involving transfer-pricing tax rulings. 107 Similar to the
OECD Model Tax Convention, the Transfer Pricing Guidelines are non-binding.
However, they also provide guidance to the Commission when determining
whether the methodology used to determine the net profit of a multinational
transfer pricing arrangement provides a “selective advantage.” 108 By providing a
set of acceptable transfer-pricing methods, the Guidelines help determine whether
a given arrangement deviates from the net profit between independent operators,

103

Id. at recital 9.

104

See Jone, supra note 88, at 1.
See OECD, Articles of the Model Convention With Respect to Taxes on Income and Capital, art. 9 (2003),
https://perma.cc/S9Y3-YB86 [hereinafter OECD Model Tax Convention]; see also Tavares et al.,
supra note 54 at 172 (“Article 9 . . . aims to ensure that entities which enter into contracts within a
corporate group establish conditions that do not differ from those of unrelated parties, in order to
protect the relevant taxable base from a potentially distortive influence of the group relations.”).
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106
107
108

See OECD Model Tax Convention, supra note 105, at art. 9.
See OECD Transfer Pricing Guidelines, supra note 45.
See Consolidated Version of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union, supra note 89.
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rather than associated enterprises. 109 These guidelines recognize five acceptable
methods of determining net profits, three of which are regarded as “traditional”
transaction methods and two of which are considered “transactional profit
methods.” 110 Traditional methods are used to compare the terms and conditions
of transactions between subsidiaries of multinationals to those of similar
standalone corporations, whereas the “transactional profit” method compares the
profitability of the subsidiary at issue with similar subsidiaries or independent
operators. 111
As stated earlier, the Commission uses the guidelines when a reference tax
system is required to determine the existence of a selective advantage for the
subsidiary in question. The three traditional methods are the comparable
uncontrolled price (CUP) method, the resale price method, and the cost-plus
method. These methods use various metrics to compare the prices charged
between the subsidiaries at issue and independent operators to determine
deviations from calculations of net profits. 112 The two transactional profit
methods include the TNMM method as well as the “transactional profit split”
method, which compare profits between the reference system and the transfer
price ruling in question. 113

IV. U NDERSTANDING THE E.U. D ECISIONS : D I STINGUI SHING
S TATE A ID FROM N ON -S TATE A ID
In the following Section, this Comment will first use the rules previously
discussed in concert with E.U. Commission case law to identify trends in
Commission decisions. Using these trends, this Comment will develop policy and
planning considerations for both Member States and multinational corporations.
Such considerations will aid in crafting national policy, making future business
decisions, and clarifying the nature of tax rulings given by States to multinationals
in the future.

109

110
111
112
113

See Richard Lyal, Transfer Pricing Rules and State Aid, 38 FORDHAM INT’L L.J. 1017, 1022–23 (2015);
see also James Kavanagh & Nicole Robins, Corporate Tax Arrangements Under E.U. State Aid Scrutiny:
The Application of the Market Economy Operator Principle, 2015 EUR. ST. AID L.Q. 358 (arguing that
recent decisions show that conformity with the OECD Transfer Pricing Guidelines is not
necessarily sufficient to demonstrate compliance with the arm’s length principle. Recent cases have
demonstrated that the Commission retains a clear preference for the Comparable Uncontrolled
Price (CUP) method, a form of a “traditional” method).
See Lyal, supra note 109, at 1021.
See Kavanagh & Robins, supra note 109, at 361–62.
See OECD Model Tax Convention, supra note 105.
Id.
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A. Case Analysis
The case analysis in the following section will focus primarily on the fourprong test of Article 107(1) of TFEU. Because this test is the primary “rule” used
to analyze tax rulings in case law, a separate analysis of each of the four factors
will elucidate the Commission’s motivations in declaring that a given tax ruling
constitutes illegal state aid. Within the four-prong test, the following analysis will
also focus on important considerations such as the reference regime used by the
commission (whether it involves the Member State tax code or the OECD
Guidelines) and whether the Commission truly collapses the notions of
“advantage” and “selectivity,” and if so, under what circumstances.

1. The measures must be imputable to the state and financed through
state resources.
As stated above, when tax rulings come before the Commission, it is often
assumed to be a prima facie fulfillment of the prong that the measure must be
imputable to the State and financed through State resources. 114 Just because a
measure lessens a burden on a corporation does not mean that it cannot be
considered a “positive” form of aid. In Commission Notice 98/C 384/03, the
E.U. executive body clarified its position on this prong as applied to taxation by
stating that, “a loss of tax revenue is equivalent to consumption of State resources
in the form of fiscal expenditure.” 115 And this position is applied relatively
uncontroversially in the case law. 116
Once a disputed measure reaches the Commission, the Member State in
question has already both provided such measure and indirectly financed it
through its own resources. After all, any tax burden relieved by one Member State
will mean that those resources will either be retained by the corporation through
double non-taxation or acquired by another country, and hence constitutes a form
114

115

116

See, for example, Commission Notice on the Application of the State Aid Rules, supra note 98; see also
DeNovio et al., supra note 8.
See Commission Notice on the Application of the State Aid Rules, supra note 98. Furthermore, this
position also applies to any aid granted through a lessening of tax burdens in local bodies inside of
Member States and State support through taxation can be provided “just as much through tax
provisions of a legislative, regulatory, or administrative nature as through the practice of tax
authorities.”
See, for example, Ireland and Alleged Aid to Apple, supra note 46, at recital 221; see also Case C-46/01,
France v. Comm’n. (Cent. Crp. Treasuries), 2002 E.C.R. II-330/23, at recital 28 (The Commission
spends only two sentences analyzing the “state resources” prong: “Second, the advantage is granted
through state resources. In the case at issue, the reduction in the tax base of central corporate
treasuries established in France results in a loss of tax revenue constituting State resources.”); see
also European Commission v. Luxembourg (Fiat), 2014/C ex 2014/NN, [2015], E.C.R. at recital
188.
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of aid granted from that particular State to the multinational corporation at issue.
The use of state resources has been found in various kinds of tax measures,
including deferrals of tax burdens, waiver of tax obligations, or a reduction of an
entity’s tax base, among others. 117 The use of state resources has also been
consistently found in cases where state aid was ultimately not found. 118
Because this factor of the Article 107(1) TFEU test is virtually always fulfilled
in the case law, whether the financing was imputable to the State and financed
through its resources often has little effect on the outcome of the case. Indeed,
this factor has always been fulfilled, even in cases where the measure granting
body was local rather than the national in its authority, 119 or when there was no
ultimate decision of illegal state aid. 120 Therefore, this Comment will spend little
time analyzing this point, as it will not be determinative.

2. The measure must confer an advantage on its recipient and the
advantage must be selective.
The concepts of “advantage” and “selectivity” in state aid cases are
deceptively simple. On the one hand, the basic question for the Commission is
merely whether (1) a benefit of some kind was conferred on the recipient, and
whether (2) that recipient alone or that recipient among a select class of taxpayers
received that benefit which was denied to others. However, because the concepts
have been hopelessly conflated by the Commission, sometimes admittedly, and
sometimes not, understanding how the two operate in isolation can prove quite
difficult. For example, when an individual taxpayer receives a benefit bestowed on
it and it alone, that certainly constitutes both an advantage and a selective measure
without further or separate analysis. 121 Additionally, just because a “selective
117

See Commission Notice 1998 O.J. (C384/03), supra note 98; see also Case C-15/14, Comm’n v. MOL
Magyar Olaj-es Gazipari Nyrt, https://perma.cc/8S5G-94W2 (case concerning reduction of
mining fees provided by Member State); see also Joined Cases 78 & 80/08, Paint Graphos v.
Comm’n, 2011 E.C.R., https://perma.cc/64F8-QWEA (tax breaks provided for cooperative
societies by member state); Case C-143/99, Adria-Wien Pipeline GmbH v. Comm’n, 2001 E.C.R.
(government provided energy tax rebates); Case T-210/02, British Aggregates Assoc. v. Comm’n,
2006 E.C.R., https://perma.cc/2BKQ-ZTLY (corporation claimed state resources were used in
scheme because they were subject to environmental tax whereas alleged competitors were not).
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See, for example, MOL Magyar, supra note 117, at recitals 43–46. (Here, although an ultimate finding
of state aid was negative, the court assumed the use of state resources to finance the measure
without argument.)
See Case C-88/03, Portuguese Republic v. Comm’n, 2006 E.C.R.
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120
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See MOL Magyar, supra note 117.
See, for example, European Commission, Procedures Relating to the Implementation of the Competition Policy:
State Aid – Luxembourg, 2016/C 258/03, [2015], E.C.R. (“whether a tax measure constitutes a
derogation from the reference system will generally coincide with the identification of the advantage
granted to the beneficiary under the measure”).
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advantage” was bestowed upon a taxpayer does not necessarily mean that said
taxpayer received illegal state aid. Cases abound where the taxpayer’s selective
benefit via reduced tax burden was justified by the “guiding principle of that [tax]
system.” 122 For these reasons, this Comment will analyze the two factors together,
given how often they are conjoined in cases and how many of their factors
coincide.
a) Case law definitions of “selective” and “advantage.”
Whether the measure confers an advantage on the recipient corporation
is one of the most important factors in determining whether illegal state aid is
present. Without the presence of a real advantage, the tax benefits will not be
substantial enough to affect intra-community trade and distort competition.
Within the realm of taxation, advantages are not positive benefits but rather relief
of tax burdens that are normally borne from the budget of the recipient. 123
In the case law, “advantages” usually stem from either a regime that favors
a certain kind of taxpayer, such as multinational corporations, or from a special
deal that a single taxpayer receives that relieves that entity from charges normally
taken from their budgets and still levied on other taxpayers in similar factual and
legal circumstances. For example, in the case concerning an aid scheme
implemented by Germany for control and coordination centers, 124 the advantage
was found in the fact that the subsidiaries in question had their taxable profit
determined not according to the normal method (difference between income and
expenditure), but according to a cost-plus method. 125 Under the cost-plus method,
the control and coordination centers apply to their costs a certain profit margin
between 5 percent and 10 percent. 126 The advantage in this case arose because the

122

123

124

125
126

See, for example, Paint Graphos, supra note 117 (deciding that while granting favorable tax treatment
to cooperative societies did constitute state aid compared to the normal tax treatment of
corporations, it was necessary to determine whether this favorable treatment was justified by the
general purposes of the Italian tax scheme given the differences between ordinary corporations and
the way cooperative societies operate).
See European Commission Notice on the Application of the State Aid Rules, supra note 98 (an
advantage may be provided through a reduction in tax base, an exemption from tax or tax credit,
or even through a deferment of tax obligation/debt).
A case-specific definition of “control and coordination center” outlines a subsidiary whose activities
include those to “service the needs of the group (e.g. accounting, consolidation reports, marketing,
production plans and research coordination).” Commission Decision: On the Aid Scheme
Implemented by Germany for Control and Coordination Centres, 2003/512/EC, [2002], E.C.R. at
recital 7.
Id. at recital 8.
Id.
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“limitation to 10% may artificially reduce the tax burden of control and
coordination centers in cases where actual margins exceed 10%.” 127
Selectivity is also one of the most important considerations; an advantage
conferred to every taxpayer would not be considered an illegal form of state aid.
To determine whether a tax measure is selective, the Commission decisions
typically divert in either one of two directions. As is evident from a review of the
state aid case law applied to taxation, when the aid at issue does not involve a
transfer pricing agreement between subsidiaries, 128 the courts will begin the
“selectivity” analysis by identifying and examining the “common” regime, which
is applicable in the subject Member State. 129 After determining the common
regime, the court will then determine whether the measure at issue derogates from
that common regime in such a way that it results in a substantial difference
between “economic operators who are in comparable legal and factual
situations.” 130 On the other hand, cases dealing with transfer-price rulings, such as
Apple, forgo the lengthy analysis in lieu of focusing more on the “advantage”
prong, in many cases assuming a prima facie case for selectivity once the advantage
is established. 131 The likely explanation for this divergence is that, because transfer
pricing rulings comprise individual agreements between nations and companies,
“selectivity” is a safe assumption without further analysis.
An example of the former can be seen in Portuguese Republic v. European Union
Commission. The aid in that case comprised a reduction in the rates of personal
income of 20 percent and a similar reduction in the corporate tax at a rate of 30
percent in the semi-autonomous Azores region of Portugal only. 132 While
Portuguese national law authorized this reduction, it allowed regions like the
Azores to overcome deficiencies due to their location in an isolated region of the
country. 133 In determining whether this measure was selective, the Commission
127

Id. at recital 22.

128

See, for example, Paint Graphos, supra note 117 (a case dealing with aid in the form of tax breaks for
cooperative societies); see also Portuguese Republic, supra note 119 (a case dealing with aid in the
form of a local semi-autonomous region granting lower tax rates than the national government); see
also Case T-399/11, Banco Santander v. Comm’n, 2014 E.C.R. (a case dealing with aid in the form
of provisions allowing corporations which are tax residents in Spain to amortize goodwill resulting
from the acquisition of shareholdings in companies which are tax resident abroad).

129

See Paint Graphos, supra note 117, at recital 49.
Id.

130
131
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See, for example, Ireland and Alleged Aid to Apple, supra note 46, at recital 381 (arguing that the
deviation from OECD administrative practice leads to a presumption of selectivity); see also
Commission Decision: On the Aid Scheme Implemented by Germany, supra note 124, at recital 32
(the fact that the regime at hand was limited to multinational companies renders it selective); Excess
Profit Exemption in Belgium, supra note 91.
See Portuguese Republic, supra note 119, at recital 14.
Id.
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first examined whether the “common regime” was the Azores region or the
entirety of Portugal. 134 After analyzing a number of factors, the court determined
that the relevant legal framework was in fact that of the nation of Portugal and in
that context the measures were selective. 135
For the purposes of selectivity, types of entities, rather than kinds of
transactions, are considered to be selective. For example, the E.U. Commission
has held that a measure applying solely to multinational groups, 136 large
corporations, 137 and new listings on the market 138 are considered selective.
Conversely, it has also held that a measure that discriminates between some forms
of transactions over others cannot be held to be selective if all entities are able to
enter into such transactions. 139
b) Collapsing the line between “advantage” and “selectivity.”
One of the biggest points of confusion that arises among scholars is the
thin, often blurry, line between the concepts of advantage and selectivity. 140 As
stated earlier, the U.S. Treasury Department’s white paper contends that the
Commission’s approach in recent cases has collapsed the concepts of advantage
and selectivity, 141 arguing that “a foundational principle of E.U. state aid law is
that advantage and selectivity are distinct elements.” 142 The Treasury Department
maintained that the Commission departed from the separation of these two
factors only at the advent of the Apple and Amazon cases, and that the executive
body no longer uses this “decisive criterion” in their decisions. 143 A review of the
case law demonstrates that not only is this view misguided, but it is also overly
simplistic in its assessment of the Commission’s application of these two factors.
There are in fact three separate approaches that have been utilized by the
Commission in applying state aid to taxation measures. In some of the case law,

134

Id. at 67–77.
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Id. at 78.
See Excess Profit Exemption in Belgium, supra note 91, at recital 138.
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Id. at recital 141.
See Case T-211/05, Italian Republic v. Comm’n, 2009 E.C.RII-02777 at recital 120,
https://perma.cc/3URF-6UQZ.
See, for example, Banco Santander, supra note 128, at recitals 57–61 (“the measure at issue applies to
all shareholdings of at least 5% in foreign companies which are held for uninterrupted period of at
least one year. It is therefore aimed not at any particular category of undertakings or production,
but at a category of economic transactions.”).
See, for example, U.S. Department of Treasury, supra note 22.
See id. at 6.
Id.
Id. at 8.
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the Commission dutifully separates the two. 144 In at least one case, the
Commission notes the similarity between the two and advocates collapsing the
concepts for cases involving individual aid (which is considered prima facie selective
since it applies to one corporate entity and that corporate entity alone), while still
maintaining a separate analysis in the case of general aid schemes. 145 Finally, some
of the most recent case law utterly collapses the two. 146 The notion of how the
courts apply the “selectivity” and “advantage” factors, and whether they are truly
conflated, is of much debate.
Air Liquide Industries provides a good example of a case where the
Commission dutifully separated the “advantage” and “selectivity” factors. 147 In
this case, Air Liquide Industries, an industrial group specializing in gases, alleged
that a Belgian tax regime was discriminatory because it had to be borne by
undertakings producing and transporting industrial gas but not those doing the
same for natural gas. 148 Here, the court separately determined that the measure
granted an advantage because the exemption put some taxpayers in a more
favorable position than others. 149 Next, the court determined that the measure was
selective because the exemptions only applied to the natural gas sector. 150 Notably,
all of the cases separating the two factors concern themselves with measures that
are general regimes aimed at specific sectors rather than personal negotiations with
individual taxpayers. 151
In contrast, those cases that tend to collapse the “advantage” and
“selectivity” factors concern measures that are, effectively or actually, individual
“deals” rather than broad regimes aimed at a larger swathe of taxpayers. 152 As
144
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146

147
148
149
150
151
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See, for example, Commission Decision: On the Aid Scheme Implemented by Germany, supra note
124; see also Commission Decision: On the Aid Scheme Implemented by Belgium for Coordination
Centres Established in Belgium, 2003/755/EC, [2003] E.C.R.
See MOL Magyar, supra note 117; see also European Commission, supra note 121.
See Ireland and Alleged Aid to Apple, supra note 46; see also Commission Decision on the Measure
SA.14588 (C 20/09) Implemented by Belgium in Favour of De Post-La Poste, 2012321/E.U.,
[2012], E.C.R.
Joined Cases C-393/04 and C-41/05, Air Liquide Industries Belgium, 2006 E.C.R.
Id. at recitals 10–19.
Id. at 40.
Id. at 41.
See, for example, DeNovio et al., supra note 8; see also Commission Decision: On the Aid Scheme
Implemented by Germany, supra note 124; Commission Decision: On the Aid Scheme
Implemented by Spain in Favour of Coordination Centers in Vizcaya, 2003/81/EC, [2002], E.C.R.;
Commission Decision: On the Aid Scheme Implemented by Belgium for Coordination Centres
Established in Belgium, supra note 144 (concerning a scheme targeting coordination centers
specifically).
See, for example, France v. Commission, supra note 116; see also Paint Graphos, supra note 117; Ireland
and Alleged Aid to Apple, supra note 46; and In Favour of De Post-La Poste, supra note 146.
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discussed earlier in this Comment, the Apple case and others concerning individual
transfer price rulings often collapse the “selectivity” prong into the determination
of an advantage. 153 However, this is not without good reason. There are a few
cases in which the Commission explicitly holds that, while the notion of advantage
and the notion of selectivity cannot be completely separated, they should be
considered separately in some instances. For example, in European Commission v.
MOL Magyar Olaj-es Gazipiari Nyrt, the Commission held that the selectivity prong
plays a separate role when the measure is a “general scheme.” 154 After all,
separately knowing whether a general scheme is aimed at certain types of
corporations, rather than all economic operators, is useful in the determination of
illegal state aid. On the other hand, when the measure is “individual,” the finding
of an advantage is “in principle, sufficient to support the presumption that it is
‘specific’ and, therefore, the conclusion that it is also selective.” 155
Given this analysis, it makes quite a bit of sense that the Commission would
separate the two factors in cases where the measure in question constitutes a
“general scheme,” whereas measures concerning individual negotiations would
cause the E.U. body to collapse them. After all, it is not logical to analyze whether
selectivity is present in an advantage aimed at only a single taxpayer. Such an
analysis reveals that the Commission may not have been so inconsistent as the
U.S. Treasury Department maintains.
c) The critical importance of the reference regime.
Another important concept related to the “selectivity” and “advantage”
factors is the reference system used as an anchor point for the measure at issue.
In the case of individualized transfer prices, the reference system will typically be
“rolled” into the concept of advantage. 156 This follows logically, as in the case of
individual negotiations the concept of advantage is analyzed more in-depth than
selectivity. For these cases, the reference system used consists of the OECD
Transfer Pricing Guidelines, which provide for far more discretion on the part of
the Commission as opposed to the Member State’s corporate tax system. 157 For
regimes aimed at specific groups of taxpayers in a Member State, the reference

153
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See Ireland and Alleged Aid to Apple, supra note 46, at recital 223–224; see also Commission Decision:
On the Aid Scheme Implemented by Germany, supra note 124, at recital 32; Excess Profit
Exemption in Belgium, supra note 91.
See MOL Magyar, supra note 117, at recital 52.
Id. at recital 51.
See Ireland and Alleged Aid to Apple, supra note 46; see also Commission Decision: On the Aid
Scheme Implemented by Spain, supra note 151.
See Excess Profit Exemption in Belgium, supra note 91; see also Commission Decision: On the Aid
Scheme Implemented by Germany, supra note 124.
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system will typically be the corporate tax system itself. 158 While not always
discussed in depth in the case law, the reference system can truly make or break a
state aid case, because the larger the Commission tends to define the reference
system, the more likely illegal state aid results. 159
For example, in Portuguese Republic v. European Commission, the semiautonomous Azores region had a special tax reduction that applied automatically
to all economic operators, designed to support undertakings in overcoming
barriers resulting from the isolation of said region. 160 In order to determine
whether the measure was selective, the Commission set about determining
whether the Azores itself or Portugal should provide the reference system, stating,
“it is possible that an infra-State body enjoys a . . . status which makes it
sufficiently autonomous . . . with the result that, by the measure it adopts, it is that
body . . . that constitutes the relevant context.” 161 Because ultimately the Azores
was not autonomous enough (given that it did not have sufficient power to reduce
its tax rates independently of the Portuguese government), the measure was
considered selective against the national tax system as a reference. 162 On the other
hand, in Government of Gibraltar v. Commission of the European Communities, a tax
reform in Gibraltar established to lower corporate tax rates was determined not to
be illegal state aid, chiefly because Gibraltar was the reference system and not the
U.K. 163 Because the reference system for material selectivity constituted solely
Gibraltar and not the remainder of the U.K., the measure was seen not to favor
any specific undertakings or regions. 164
Additionally, even when the geographic scope of the reference system is not
at issue, other factors can expand or shrink the common regime. For example, in
the McDonald’s case, in which a measure offered by Luxembourg to McDonald’s
provided favorable tax consequences on its intellectual property rights, the
Commission included a double tax treaty between the U.S. and Luxembourg as
part of the reference system. 165
158

See Paint Graphos, supra note 117; see also France Telecom v. European Commission, Case C-81/10
P, [2011], E.C.R.
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Compare, for example, Portuguese Republic, supra note 119, with Government of Gibraltar v.
Commission of the European Communities, Cases T-211/04 and T-215/04, [2008], E.C.R.
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See Portuguese Republic, supra note 119, at recital 14.
Id. at recital 58.
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164
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Id. at recitals 76–78.
See Government of Gibraltar, supra note 159, at recital 115.
Id.
See Procedures Relating to the Implementation of the Competition Policy, supra note 121, at recital
72 (“the Luxembourg corporate income tax system constitutes the reference system against which
that ruling should be examined for a selective advantage . . . [it] should also be considered to include
the double tax treaties to which Luxembourg is a party.”).
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A final consideration the Commission notes concerning the “selective” and
“advantage” factors is the exception to illegal state aid when the subject measure
results from a guiding principle of the tax regime at issue. One example, British
Aggregates Association v. Commission of the European Communities, 166 concerned
environmental levies raised against virgin aggregates in the U.K. based on
environmental concerns. 167 In that case, a British company complained to the
Commission, alleging that the levy put them in a worse situation compared to
other producers in a similar factual and legal situation (exports were exempt from
the levy). 168 In its decision, the Commission determined that, while ordinarily there
could be a selective advantage conferring a detriment to the applicant, because the
exemption for exports was “justified by the nature of the [statutory levy] as an
indirect tax,” no selectivity was present. 169 Part of the rationale in this case was
that an environmental levy is subsumed under state powers, and a state is “free to
set its priorities as regards its environmental policy.” 170 Typically, the justification
of a selective advantage through guiding principle of the tax regime at issue is
difficult to obtain. The Commission has held that courts must distinguish between
measures that are intrinsic and extrinsic to the tax regime, disallowing justification
in the latter. 171 Additionally, courts have engaged in a detailed analysis of the
Member State’s attempt to justify their regimes, with no small amount of
skepticism involved. 172
Ultimately, for planning purposes, E.U. Member States hoping to attract
industry while avoiding Commission scrutiny would be well advised to craft a
regime amenable to multinational investment rather than issue likely advantageous
and selective tax rulings. To do this, Member States would be wise to somehow
limit the scope of their reference regimes (as shown above, smaller reference
166
167
168
169
170
171
172

See British Aggregates, supra note 117.
Id. at recitals 1–25.
Id.
Id. at recital 153.
Id. at recital 171.
See Paint Graphos, supra note 117, at recital 69.
See, for example, Commission Decision: On the Aid Scheme Implemented by Germany, supra note
124; see also Portuguese Republic, supra note 119, at recitals 41 and 82 (Member State attempted to
argue that allowing a corporate tax reduction in an insular region such as the Azores is justified by
the guiding principle of “ability to pay, with the aim of redistribution.” The Commission retorted
that because the measure applied to all economic operators with no distinction as to financial
situation, there is no true redistribution principle involved); Adria-Wien Pipeline, supra note 117, at
recital 48 (“neither the large number of eligible undertakings nor the diversity and size of the
sectors . . . provide any grounds for concluding that a State initiative constitutes a general measure
of economic policy); Excess Profit Exemption in Belgium, supra note 91 (Member State attempted to
justify non-taxation of subsidiary due to fears of double taxation; Commission argued that
adjustment was done “proactively and unilaterally” regardless of any true risk).
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regimes are generally respected whereas larger ones are not). This step may prove
difficult, but somehow limiting the geographic scope of the reference system will
likely only help the Member State receive a favorable ruling. Additionally, further
steps such as justifying the measure granted as part of the tax regime will also only
help a Member State receive deference from the Commission.

3. Measure must distort or threaten to distort competition and have
the potential to affect trade between states.
Unlike the previous two factors, this factor does not comprise a majority of
the Commission’s efforts and is often addressed in a brief paragraph or two. This
is simply because this factor is assumed to apply to the measure at issue. 173 For
one thing, the Commission has held that there is no burden on the court’s part to
establish that the “aid in question has a real effect on trade between Member
States . . . but only to examine whether that aid is liable to affect competition. 174
The Commission has additionally maintained that it is not even necessary that the
subject taxpayer be involved in intra-community trade. The simple fact of the State
granting a selective advantage to the taxpayer makes it even more difficult for
other companies to penetrate the internal market, resulting in a distortion of
competition. 175 Because of these two factors in particular, the Commission
admittedly takes a fairly broad approach to this factor and affirms it in all cases. 176

B. Policy and Planning Considerations
A number of important policy and planning considerations follow from the
conclusions drawn from the case law above. For example, given the fact that
“individualized” transfer pricing schemes tend to receive higher scrutiny under
the advantage factor, collapsing the two into essentially a single test has important
ramifications for corporate tax planning purposes. General schemes that nations
apply and that corporations take advantage of will be subject to a lengthy
“selectivity” test, with the result that Member States will have to craft any regimes
for multinational corporations carefully so as to avoid being subject to a ruling of
illegal state aid.
Additionally, for corporations, knowing the “reference system” when
deciding to place a subsidiary in a new Member State will have important
173

174

175
176

See, for example, Ireland and Alleged State Aid to Apple, supra note 46, at recital 220 for the onesentence analysis of this factor (“Apple is a globally active firm, operating in various Member States,
so that any aid in its favour distorts or threatens to distort competition and has the potential to
affect intra-Union trade.”).
See Paint Graphos, supra note 117, at recital 78 [emphasis added]; see also Italian Republic, supra note
138, at recital 152.
See Air Liquide Industries, supra note 147, at recital 46.
Id.
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ramifications, since how this factor is defined can reduce the risk of the measure
being deemed state aid. The reference system has even more important
ramifications for parties entering transfer pricing deals with Member States, given
the OECD Transfer Pricing Guidelines and the Commission’s strict application
of it. Within that realm, using tax treaties as a background to tax rulings can have
potentially beneficial results for corporations, since these will get folded in among
the reference system. However, it is important to keep in mind that the
Commission will analyze the application of these treaties to the measure with a
high level of scrutiny. 177 Rather than merely displace treaties, as the U.S. Treasury
maintains, the analysis of treaties in the cases where they may apply to the
reference system reveals that the Commission is dedicated to ensuring that the
spirit and letter of the treaty is upheld. 178
It is also apparent from the case law that the distortion of competition is
often assumed by the Commission, which acknowledges that this factor is broadly
applied in cases concerning state aid. It is apparent from the case law that almost
any activity that has the potential to affect the ability of other corporations to
compete in a Member State or affects intra-state trade in any way will be found to
distort competition and affect trade between states. This gives the Commission
incredible power to determine that a given measure affects intra-State trade, so
much so that it renders the purpose of analyzing a measure on this factor basically
futile.
Additionally, the concept of “negotiation” has arisen in at least a portion of
the case law. In Apple, one of the factors that led the Commission to determine
that the transfer-pricing ruling constituted an advantage was because it was the
“result of negotiation rather than a pricing methodology.” 179 While negotiation
was a factor tilting the measure towards illegal state aid in Apple, in European
Commission v. MOL Magyar Olaj-es Gazipiari Nyrt the court determined that
negotiation in fact was not enough to confer on the agreement a “selective
177
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179

See, for example, Procedures Relating to the Implementation of the Competition Policy, supra note
121; Excess Profit Exemption in Belgium, supra note 91.
See, for example, Procedures Relating to the Implementation of the Competition Policy, supra note
121 (E.U. Member State and taxpayer arguing that because Luxembourg would expect that
McDonald’s income may be taxed in the U.S. since it is a “permanent establishment” from a
Luxembourg tax perspective, then no taxation should occur in Luxembourg. The Commission
determined that the Member State and the taxpayer erred in only considering the definition of a
“permanent establishment” under Luxembourg domestic law to be relevant for application of the
provision of the treaty and not whether the branch also constitutes a “permanent establishment”
under U.S. law. The Member State and taxpayer’s error resulted in not a prevention of just double
taxation, as the treaty intended, but the elimination of any tax at all).
See Ireland and Alleged Aid to Apple, supra note 46, at recital 150 (the Commission concluded that
the negotiations reinforced the idea that the outcome of the method proposed was not consistent
with what an independent operator would have accepted).
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character.” 180 MOL concerned an agreement between the Hungarian State and the
oil and gas company MOL in relation to mining fees. 181 Due to this agreement and
a coincidental legislative increase in the rate of mining fees, MOL was spared the
latter due to conditions of the former. 182 At issue was the concern that this
exemption, which was the result, on the one hand, of a legal framework, and on
the other hand of negotiations with respect to fee rates, constituted a selective
advantage. However, the court of appeals upheld the lower court’s ruling,
maintaining that negotiation towards a lower fee not subject to change in
legislation by itself is not enough to confer a selective character. 183
Such a clear discrepancy in the treatment of negotiation is troubling and
presents uncertainty for tax planners. One possible way to justify these two
seemingly conflicting rulings is through the fact that in Apple, negotiation was one
of several factors that led to a finding of state aid. Similarly, in MOL, the court
maintained that it would not suffice for negotiation alone to lead to a conclusion of
selectivity. Spelling out this sub-factor on the part of the Commission will provide
more clarity and certainty for tax planners worldwide. Additionally, it will help
Member States to know that negotiation, while certainly a factor that can and does
lead to a finding of state aid, can still occur if unaccompanied by other troubling
factors.
Given the importance of the reference system, transfer-pricing rulings are at
a severe disadvantage as compared to other types of favorable tax rulings that
corporations may receive. While the reference system used in tax rulings other
than transfer-pricing measures will receive high levels of scrutiny, the Commission
gives a Member State deference in crafting its own policies and priorities. 184 On
the other hand, the reference system used by the Commission in transfer-pricing
rulings (The OECD Transfer Pricing Guidelines) is one that the Member State
has zero independence to develop. Because the Transfer Pricing Guidelines are
international guidelines, Member States are presumed to have far less influence
over their design, which makes it a likely reference system for finding illegal state
aid.
Finally, it is also worth noting that transfer-pricing disputes involve a
significant degree of factual complexity. This leaves room for Member States and
multinational corporations to shift to factual grounds for lower tax liabilities, while
still remaining within the framework of acceptable legal standards and OECD
guidelines. For example, suppose that the Member State exercised discretion not
in granting a specific tax ruling or in determining how to apply the tax code, but
180
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See MOL Magyar, supra note 117, at recital 87.
Id. at recitals 5–19.
Id.
Id. at recital 87.
See, for example, British Aggregates, supra note 117.
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rather in determining what activities are considered “comparable.” It is likely that
the E.U. Commission will take a broad approach to policing a factual level of
discretion, given the liberal application of “selectivity” and “advantage” outlined
above. However, this remains an open question which further Commission
activity may elucidate for curious taxpayers.

V. C ONCLUSION
While there has been and continues to be substantial confusion surrounding
the Commission’s recent cases determining state aid in various E.U. tax rulings,
there is still some method inside the madness that is inherent in this system. For
example, the U.S. Treasury Department maintains that the Commission’s
collapsing of the concept of “selectivity” and “advantage” represents a severe
break with tradition, seemingly without explanation. However, careful analysis of
the cases has revealed that the two concepts have always been applied somewhat
flexibly, and in cases of individualized regime tax measures, the two factors will
be conjoined because an advantageous ruling for one taxpayer is certainly
selective. In more generalized regime cases, the two will be separated because an
advantageous ruling applying to all does not qualify as state aid. Additionally, while
the Treasury Department argues that the rulings violate international tax treaties,
careful analysis of the cases will reveal a nuanced and faithful approach when
including treaties in the reference system.
A review of the case law surrounding state aid and taxation should hopefully
reveal a number of trends and concepts for tax planners to be aware of. Knowing
that the reference system maintains key importance as a significant factor in state
aid will help corporations when they negotiate with the Member States in which
they have subsidiaries. Additionally, knowing how the case law has consistently
applied the concept of negotiation as well as distortion of competition will help
future corporations and Member States understand the ramifications of the
transactions they enter together.
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